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JUDICIAL MEDIATION AND SIGNALING
Edward Brunet*
Two seemingly inconsistent developments in settling pending litigation
merit special attention. Pretrial conferences conducted under Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure afford the trial judge an opportunity to engage
in a range of settlement activities. The court may "signal" the likely result with
a not too subtle query, may ask the parties to attend a settlement conference, or
may set an impossible trial date that leaves little alternative but to settle. Under
this "traditional" view, the judge will strive to settle cases assigned to the trial
court. Put succinctly, the all-purpose judges who use this traditional view
unabashedly try to settle their own cases, and later preside over the trial if
settlement is not reached.' A judge's settlement effort may take alternative
forms, ranging from a formal judicial mediation to an evaluative pretrial com-
ment that a party's case "looks weak."
However, the modem view proceeds in a markedly different direction.
Increasingly, judges are using the pretrial process to set settlement conferences
before a different judge of the same court. Judge A will use a pretrial confer-
ence to ask or cajole the parties into agreeing to participate in a settlement
conference held before Judge B. Judge B will often be a self-appointed special-
ist at settling cases and may be trained in mediation techniques. Many court-
houses have one or more judges who are very skilled mediators and would
prefer to mediate rather than try cases. When the parties appear before Judge B
for their settlement conference, the court will essentially be mediating the case.
This is modem judicial mediation, characterized by a clear division of labor
between the judge assigned to a case and the judge who mediates.
This article will analyze the tension that exists between the traditional
view, under which courts seek to settle and evaluate their own cases, and the
modem view, under which the case is assigned to a different, more "neutral"
judge who may be an expert in settling cases using mediation techniques.
The term "judicial mediation" as used in this essay includes, but goes
beyond, mere settlement conferences or judicial mediation sessions. It broadly
embraces the concept of settlement efforts by a trial judge and includes any oral
or written case evaluation whatsoever by a judge. Here, the term includes sig-
naling by the assigned trial judge at a Rule 16 pre-trial conference (e.g., com-
ments by the court that a particular claim or defense may "appear
unsubstantiated"), similar evaluative comments made by the trial court when
* Henry J. Casey Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. I thank Jean Stemlight,
Deborah Hensler, and Nancy Welsh for comments.
1 See, e.g., MARC GALANTER, THE EMERGENCE OF THE JUDGE AS A MEDIATOR IN CIVIL
CASES I (Disputes Processing Research Program Working Paper No. 1984-5, 1985) (assert-
ing that "[m]ost American judges participate to some extent in the settlement of some of the
cases before them" and explaining that judicial participation in settlement of their own cases
"has become a respectable, even esteemed, feature of judicial work").
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denying a motion for summary judgment (e.g., "while I cannot say that I think
highly of the plaintiff's case, I must deny the defendant's summary judgment
motion because there may be an issue of fact"), court-annexed mediation before
a judge, and settlement conferences. 2 Judicial mediation comes in a variety of
forms and occurs at a variety of times, from very early in the case, soon after
filing, to the plenary trial itself.3 The essence of judicial mediation is evalua-
tion by a judge and communication of that evaluation to the parties.
One introductory confession about my prior thinking on this issue is in
order. At a 1995 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference meeting, I confidently took
the academic position that the modem view was the only possibly correct pro-
cedure. I lamented that judges who tried to settle their own cases by holding
more formal mediation sessions risked losing valuable neutrality and failed to
use the advantages that a division of labor between judge and mediator might
provide. While I was not the only person who took this position,4 it is not
unfair to say that I was certain that I was one hundred percent correct.
Upon reflection and the passage of seven years, I am confident that the
certainty of my earlier conclusion was at least premature. While there is much
to be said in favor of the modem view, it is not at all clear to me that systematic
and routine assignment of settlement conferences to another judge should be
the norm in every case. I also gave too little thought to the efficiencies of
judicial signaling and the relationship of signaling (clearly a type of case evalu-
ation) to mediation. Put differently, there are so many advantages to letting
courts use the panoply of methods available to settle their own cases that an
inflexible rule, mandating routine reassignment and banning signaling, is prob-
ably inadvisable. In particular, this essay argues that judicial signaling plays a
valuable role in achieving fair and accurate litigation outcomes, whether or not
the signaling leads to settlement.
I. PONDERING THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL MEDIATION
Judicial mediation is still mediation. When a judge holds a mediation ses-
sion, normal mediation procedures are generally used. Nonetheless, judicial
mediation is unlike other forms of mediation in one very important respect: the
2 See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transportation Antitrust Litigation, 148 F.R.D. 297, 305-06,
316-17 (N.D. Ga. 1993) (in approving class action settlement, the judge sent the signal that
he would have granted a summary judgment for the defendants in an antitrust suit, and
asserts "[P]laintiffs possess a slim chance of recovery should this action proceed to trial" and
that the state of antitrust doctrine and plaintiffs' lack of evidence "create a considerable risk
to the class should plaintiffs proceed to summary judgment or trial").
I In theory, judicial mediation can even occur on appeal. Every Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals now has a mediation program. Appellate mediation is provided, however, not by
judges, but by neutral third parties, schooled in mediation techniques, and is therefore differ-
ent than the mediation that is the focus of this essay, mediative efforts by the trial court. See
generally ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS (1997); EDWARD BRUNET
& CHARLES B. CRAVER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ADVOCATE'S PERSPEC-
TIVE 547-49 (2d ed. 2001) ("[I]n appellate mediation, the neutral is not 'judicial': - a third
party mediator, not a judge, serves as the mediator.").
I I was part of a panel on settlement procedures and techniques. I was the lone academic on
the panel; the other members were federal judges.
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mediator is a judge. This section will compare the similarities and differences
between judicial mediation and conventional mediation supplied by private
mediators. In particular, the section is designed to provide a descriptive over-
view of the style of mediation provided by trial judges.
A. Judicial Mediation as Muscle, "Walk and Talk" Mediation: An
Overview of the Characteristics of Judicial Mediation
The typical model of mediation delivered by today's judge is that of evalu-
ative or "muscle mediation."5 In this type of mediation, the judge, as mediator,
appraises the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties' cases, presents a
rough case evaluation to the parties, and seeks to extract settlement offers that
mirror the judge's analytical perception of the dispute.
My conclusion that judges use their muscle when they mediate is some-
what anecdotal. Former students, some of whom hire me as a private mediator
in complex environmental cases, consistently provide me with entertaining war
stories of muscle mediation sessions conducted by judges. These anecdotes are
confirmed by several writings by federal and state judges who have openly
explained their evaluative techniques.6 Additional confirmation of the judicial
use of evaluative mediation derives from training videotapes used to teach
judges how to mediate.7 The significance of these educational videos should
not be understated. Another judge who stars in a videotape mediation session
using the evaluative model to successfully settle a case will be likely to influ-
ence a judge untrained in mediation.
I do not suggest that modem judges never use a mediation style closer to
that known as facilitative mediation, where the mediator does not evaluate but,
I See generally STACY LEE BURNS, MAKING SETTLEMENT WORK: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
WORK OF JUDICIAL MEDIATORS 7 (2000) (sitting judges mediate by offering opinions "as to
what a 'fair' settlement in the case" would be); Hiram E. Chodosh, Judicial Mediation and
Legal Culture, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/1299/ijde/chodosh.htm (last accessed
January 22, 2003) ("[Jludicial mediators tend to be more evaluative than facilitative, that is,
they are generally more willing to share their evaluation of the merits or value of a claim.").
6 See, e.g., Noel P. Fox, Settlement: Helping the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53
F.R.D. 129, 154 (1971) (urging judges who mediate to "develop a keen sense of evaluation"
that will "reflect the subjective positions of the parties"); Stanley Ryan & John Wickham,
Pre-trial Practice in Wisconsin Courts, 1954 Wisc. L. REv. 5, 16 ("I offer suggestions,
intimate to the attorneys and clients the possibility and extent of liability, suggest the range
of what I believe to be a fair settlement, and then also attempt to persuade the parties and
their attorneys to accept a settlement within that range."); Ruggero J. Aldisert, A Metropoli-
tan Court Conquers Its Backlog, 51 JUDICATURE 247, 248 (1968) (at a compulsory pre-trial
settlement conference, the judge makes "a realistic appraisal of both sides" of a case).
Accord Deborah Hensler, A Research Agenda: What We Need to Know About Court-Con-
nected ADR, Disp. REsOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 15 (suggesting that judicial mediation is
evaluative rather than facilitative); GALANTER, supra note 1, at 9-12 (collecting authority
that judges present their evaluations at settlement conferences, and concluding that judges
use evaluative techniques); Lawrence F. Schiller & James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Settlement
Techniques, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 39, 52 (1981) (describing judicial mediation as a judge
convincing the attorney of the fairness of a judicial evaluation of the case, then persuading
the client to accept a figure agreed to by the attorney).
I See, e.g., THE SETrLEMENT OF Sechrist v. Burlington Northern: A Videotape for
Mediators (Federal Judicial Center 1994) (videotape of a settlement conference before a
federal judge who clearly uses evaluative mediation).
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instead, asks probing questions to allow the parties to reach their own interests
and positions.8 Undoubtedly, some mediator judges use a more facilitative
style and eschew evaluative mediation.9 Moreover, it is undoubtedly the ca se
that individual judge mediators, like private mediators, combine facilitative and
evaluative styles.1 ° Nonetheless, I remain steadfast in my belief that the typical
style of a judge who mediates is primarily that of evaluative mediation.
The process in which a judge forms a case evaluation merits focus. The
court possesses instant access to the entire case file. In addition, if the judicial
mediator is the judge originally assigned to the case, all case events that
occurred prior to the mediation session cannot help but inform the court. The
process of hearing arguments and digesting briefs regarding earlier motions to
dismiss and motions for summary judgment will color the way a court evalu-
ates a case. In addition, some judges will request mediation briefs which may
set forth the main points of contention, case strengths, and prior settlement
history. 1
Some judicial mediators will form and articulate evaluations during the
mediation session itself. While judicial mediators, like conventional private
mediators, can begin with opening sessions involving all parties and their coun-
sel, it is at caucus sessions that most "evaluation" occurs. The judicial media-
tor is likely to meet with each side privately. One purpose of these confidential
caucus sessions is for the judge to learn more about each side's case. In addi-
tion, caucuses afford the court a chance to present a confidential case evalua-
tion and to try to convince a party that the evaluation is correct. Caucuses also
constitute the foundation of offer generation. They will often conclude with the
judicial mediator obtaining an offer and authority to convey the offer to the
opposing party. The mediator becomes a conduit between the disputants, con-
veying and explaining offers and counter offers.
8 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING To CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 96-107 (1994)
(facilitative mediation permits the parties to form their own empowered negotiation positions
and eventually reach a settlement that will be respected).
9 See, e.g., ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETrLEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 65-66 (1996) (sug-
gesting that judges who mediate use both evaluative and facilitative styles).
10 See Murray S. Levin, The Propriety of Evaluative Mediation: Concerns About the Nature
and Quality of an Evaluative Opinion, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 267, 269 (2001) ("In
practice, however, many mediators combine aspects of facilitative and evaluative media-
tion."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR From Ideol-
ogy, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL. 247, 249 (cautioning that the utility of the evaluative and
facilitative labels "should not drive ... policymakers to categorize mediation as either evalu-
ative or facilitative" because "[miuch mediation ... has substantial elements of both schools
of thought"); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The Need for
Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949
(1997) [hereinafter Stempel, Beyond Formalism] (criticizing either characterization of evalu-
ative or facilitative mediation styles as creating a false dichotomy).
I1 See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 209-10 (describing materials given to mediator
by the parties to a dispute); Patrick F. Kelly, Mediation: A Settlement Conference Format
that Works, in ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 133, 136
(1987) ("[c]ounsel are also encouraged to submit to the mediator or settlement judge a state-
ment detailing factual or legal issues and the requested relief").
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In mediation theory, the process of obtaining and transmitting information
is critical. 12 The mediator is an information filter.' 3 Acting as the dual agent
for both disputing parties, the private mediator asks questions, whether at a
private caucus or at a public session attended by all parties, in order to gain
valuable information. Information gained during a mediation session can edu-
cate the mediator and permit a more informed and accurate 4 evaluation of the
case.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that judicial mediators concentrate less on
obtaining information and more on conveying information when mediating a
case. This approach may be a reflection of the limited time available for judi-
cial mediation. Judicial mediation generally tends to consist of one short, two
or three-hour effort to settle a case. In a mediation of such limited duration, a
judge will not be able to hold multiple, lengthy caucus sessions capable of
supplying additional information. Instead, the typical judicial mediator focuses
on evaluation and muscle during caucuses. In some private mediations, the
parties do most of the talking during caucus sessions and the mediator gains
information by listening. In judicial mediation caucuses, the parties largely
listen and the judge talks.
In judicial mediation, the court's role will often be that of transmitting
offers and counteroffers between the parties. The judge acts as a go-between,
seeking to achieve a working compromise by shifting from one party caucus to
the next. After a fully evaluative caucus in which the judge "talks," the court
then "walks" between the parties.
Evaluative mediation can also contain "noisy" caucus exchanges between
the mediator and a party.' 5 Consider the following example. In A v. B, A tells
the mediator in caucus he "cannot settle for less than $100,000," then hints that
he would indeed accept a $75,000 offer from B. The mediator then meets with
B and tells B that "A would probably take $75,000." This noisy communica-
tion from the mediator might lead to a $75,000 offer from B and a subsequent
settlement. Yet, the mediator's declaration that "A would probably take
$75,000," while true, was unauthorized as A never gave the mediator specific
authority to reveal his willingness to accept a $75,000 offer. Indeed, A might
have expected that the mediator would tender to B an offer of $100,000.
Noisy mediation helps to settle cases, yet it can destroy the parties' trust in
a mediator whom they perceive has breached a confidence. Noisy mediation
occurs naturally in the ebb and flow of evaluative mediation, whether judicial
mediation or muscle mediation. There is a danger that noisy mediation can
inhibit the effectiveness of judicial mediation, as well as private mediation, by
destroying party trust. A mediator who leaks information gained in confidence
12 See generally Jennifer Geralda Brown & Ian Ayers, Economic Rationales for Mediation,
80 VA. L. REv. 323, 330-31 (1994) (setting forth critical nature of information exchange
between mediator and the disputants).
"3 See Richard A. Posner, Mediation, Text of the Eleventh Annual Frank E.A. Sander Lec-
ture, American Bar Association's Section of Dispute Resolution (July 8, 2000) (characteriz-
ing the mediator as a conduit of information between the opposing sides).
14 See, e.g., Norman Brand, Learning to Use the Mediation Process - A Guide for Lawyers,
47 ARa. J. 6, 8-12 (Dec. 1992) (describing "information centered mediation" as a process in
which the mediator obtains and uses "superior information gained through formal study").
1" See Brown & Ayers, supra note 12, at 331.
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is not someone who can be trusted. This problem is complicated by another
dynamic of both judicial and private mediation - the mediator's questions and
comments to the opposing side can add information going beyond what one
side may have wanted to convey to the other. Judge Posner suggests that the
mediator can "fuzz up" information and act as an "impediment to transparent
communication" between the parties.'
6
Therefore, confidentiality is another critical feature of mediation. I" The
parties, when in caucus, speak to the mediator "in confidence." The mediator
may not disclose confidential information to the other side without express per-
mission of a party. This confidentiality concept supports trust, another corner-
stone concept of mediation theory. 8 The parties will not disclose valuable
information to a mediator they do not trust.1 9 Mediators who breach the duty
to keep information confidential soon lose the trust of disputants and cannot
function effectively.
The subject of trust and judicial mediation is sticky. Some parties will
trust a judge simply out of respect for the judiciary. The legitimacy of an inde-
pendent judiciary,2 ° central to our American justice system, spills over to foster
respect for judges who mediate. Institutional respect for judges helps to make
judicial mediation effective. Other parties may respect an individual judge for
reasons unrelated to an independent judiciary, namely, positive prior interac-
tions or a general positive personal reputation.
However, public trust toward sitting judges who mediate cannot be
assumed. Individual or institutional reasons can cause a lack of trust toward
judicial mediation. A judge with a checkered general reputation is unlikely to
be trusted by a litigator or a client forced to mediate before that judge. This
might make the judge's evaluation less influential and tend to deter disclosure
of confidential information. Moreover, a judicial mediation process that does
not instill public confidence can cause institutional distrust toward the general
process of mediation by judges. If this occurs, even respected judges possess-
ing great reputations may have a hard time mediating effectively.
Professor Frank Sander rightly argues that a judge who seeks to mediate
cases assigned to her faces a lack of trust from the disputants. 2' He theorizes
that the disputants will be unlikely to speak candidly to a judicial mediator who
will later be in a position to decide a case based upon allegedly confidential
information obtained during a mediation session. Sander's position appears
logical. Some parties will not open up to the judge assigned to hear a case.
16 Posner, supra note 13.
17 See BRUNET & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 182 ("Confidentiality is a hallmark of
mediation.").
18 See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment, Disp. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at
11 ("To be effective, the mediation process must inspire candor by both parties, something
that is unlikely to happen if the mediator can later don his judicial robe and render a deci-
sion, perhaps based in part on confidential information that was imparted to him in the
mediation session.").
19 See PIOTR SZTOMPKA, TRUST: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 25 (1999) (defining trust as a
function of risk and a "bet about the future contingent actions of others") (emphasis in
original).
20 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
21 See Sander, supra note 18.
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
This point, however, does not necessarily condemn all judicial mediation. Par-
ties may transfer critical information to an independent judicial mediator not
assigned to the case.
One last definitional point concerns the term "settlement conference."
Because case evaluation from a judge is the essence of both judicial mediation
and a settlement conference, there is not a great deal of difference between
these terms. As aptly put by Professor Hensler, "court mediation is a lot like a
settlement conference."22
B. Differences Between Judicial and Private Mediation
While the previous discussion demonstrates similarities between judicial
and private mediation, there remain fundamental differences between evalua-
tive mediation provided by judges and private mediators.
1. Time Constraints of Judicial Mediation
Judges who mediate operate under different time constraints than private
mediators. Paid by salary and mediating from a set of institutional pressures
rather than a profit motive, judges naturally can devote less time to mediation
than private mediators. Private mediators, typically paid by the hour, have little
or no incentive not to be deliberate when mediating. Leisurely and multiple
mediation sessions are expected in private mediation. There is little pressure to
cut caucus sessions short. In great contrast, the typical judge who mediates
only can devote roughly two or three hours to mediating any one case.23 Little
opportunity for repeat mediation sessions exists in the contemporary culture of
judicial mediation. Early Neutral Evaluation 24 has thrived because of the need
to provide meaningful and accurate case evaluations to the litigants, and the
22 Hensler, supra note 6, at 18.
23 See BURNS, supra note 5, at 21 (quoting a judge's lament that he had only two hours to
mediate a case set for forty days of trial); D. MARIE PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 84-85, 103 (Federal Judicial Center 1986) (reporting nature of
settlement conferences held by Magistrate Judge Pat Irwin of the Western District of
Oklahoma, who spends "between two to three hours on a case," and republishing judicial
workload grid of Judge Robert Keeton (D. Mass.), estimating that a judge would spend one
hour at a settlement conference); PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 9, at 303-07 (report-
ing that settlement conferences held by magistrate judges of the Western District of Wiscon-
sin "last anywhere from fifteen minutes to five hours"). Cf. Roselle L. Wissler, Court-
Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 641, 651-52 (2002) (in Ohio state court mediations study,
seventy-seven percent of mediation sessions held by court-appointed attorney mediators
employed half or full-time by the courts lasted between thirty-one minutes and three hours);
Douglas A. Henderson, Mediation Success: An Empirical Analysis, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON Dis,.
RESOL. 105, 143 (1996) (concluding that data indicates that the length of mediation sessions
"was positively related to settlement .... The longer the process lasted, the more likely the
mediation would settle in full."); Thomas B. Metzloff, et al., Empirical Perspectives on
Mediation and Malpractice, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 118-19 (Winter 1997) (col-
lecting data on court-ordered mediations before private mediators in North Carolina state
courts, suggested 16% last 1.1 to 2.0 hours, 27% last 2-3 hours, 19.1% last 3-4 hours, 13%
last 4-5 hours, 8% last 5-6 hours, 5.6% last 6-7 hours, and 5.6% last more than 7 hours).
24 See, e.g., David I. Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: The Second Phase, 1989 J. Disp.
RESOL. 1.
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inability of trial and magistrate judges to devote the time needed to meaning-
fully evaluate claims.2 5
These same time constraints inhibit productive post-mediation contact
between the judge and the parties to a dispute. When mediation ends without a
settlement, it is very common for the private mediator to telephone and some-
times even visit each party to seek ways to continue the settlement process.
While some judges who mediate might use the very same post-mediation pro-
cedure, most lack the time to engage in similar post-session conduct. Some
judges may also feel it is improper or unseemly for the court to initiate out-of-
court, ex parte contact with individual litigants.
2. Mediators Wearing Black: The Contrasting Perceived Abilities of
Judges and Private Market Mediators to Evaluate
Judges and private mediators have contrasting abilities to evaluate dis-
putes. Judges may have a built-in, natural advantage in case evaluation, since
evaluation, in the form of constant decisions is the everyday task of a judge. At
the same time, judges have institutional pressures that may prevent them from
supplying a complete set of sessions that would allow a case to settle, or to
settle most effectively.
While the private mediator with substantial specialty experience may pos-
sess similar expertise in case evaluation, a judge is viewed as having an innate
perception of evaluative legitimacy unavailable to all but a few private market
mediators. Judges who wear black have almost automatic authority when
assessing a case.26 Parties naturally respect judges, whether they are judging,
sentencing, or mediating. Such institutional respect is simply absent in the
market for most private mediators.
Hiring patterns for respected judges who leave the bench to enter the
mediation market confirm this point. A bidding war among mediation provid-
ers erupted when former Chief Justice Armand Arabian of the California
Supreme Court left the bench to mediate.27 Joint ventures of retired judges
appear to be successful and busy providers of mediation,2 8 more so than mere
litigation experts who may know a substantive area of law well but lack the
credibility and respect that comes with prior judicial experience.
25 See 3 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 16.53(5)(c) (3d ed.
2001) (Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil asserts that Early Neutral Evaluators "can devote
more time to the individual cases assigned to them than can busy district judges"); see also
Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Eve-
rybody Else Does - Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 Emory
L.J. 83 (2002) (stressing time constraints that inhibit judges and lack of incentive to expend
extra time on particular matters).
26 My authority for this proposition is the seeming ease with which retired judges get ADR
work. Taking off a black robe helps a neutral obtain business. Former judges wear a cloak
of black even without a robe.
27 See Margaret A. Jacobs, Retired Judges Seize Rising Role in Settling Disputes in Califor-
nia, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1996, at Al, 5.
28 Id.; BuRNs, supra note 5, at 20 (describing merger of JAMS and ENDISPUTE and
explaining that "popularity of early retirement by judges to work at JAMS or other ADR
providers has given some commentators concern that these opportunities are enticing many
knowledgeable and talented sitting judges away from the public courts").
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Nonetheless, judicial mediators can lose their evaluative edge. Judges
who evaluate or mediate in a way that decreases trust will not be able to medi-
ate successfully.2 9 The natural judicial advantage to evaluate issues is not auto-
matic and can be lost through incompetence or indiscretion. Not every retired
judge will be sought after to mediate. Respected retired judges with an ability
to naturally evaluate a case appear to get the most mediation work. In addition,
the perception of being unbiased helps former judges get mediation clients.
Being typecast as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant will not help a judge who
wants to act as a neutral.30
3. Contrasting Types of Evaluative Mediation
Not all evaluative mediation is the same. The evaluative mediator,
whether privately hired or a judge, who ann twists and cajoles in an effort to
reach settlement, will often suffer unpopularity. In the model of evaluative
mediation, most disputants will anticipate and respect the evaluation process.
In contrast, they may not appreciate an overly assertive mediator's attempts to
coerce a settlement. A true "muscle mediator" may not be admired when he
overly flexes the evaluative muscle. It is one thing for a mediator to evaluate,
but quite another for the mediator to cajole or pressure a settlement.
There is no reason to assume that either private mediators or judicial
mediators are more likely to cross the line to over-evaluative mediation. Yet,
one can easily imagine some judges who are more than willing to arm-twist a
settlement. The problem of pressuring a settlement was so great in Dodds v.
Commission on Judicial Performance that a commission recommended a pub-
lic censure of the court's self-described "assertive" judicial "style. ' 31 In refus-
ing to sanction the trial judge, the California Supreme Court nonetheless
observed that the judge exceeded "his proper role and casts disrepute on the
judicial office" when he "repeatedly interrupt[ed] a litigant and yell[ed] angrily
and without adequate provocation." 32 Private mediators who misbehave can
easily be discharged and lose business. In contrast, sitting judges possess a
degree of job security unavailable in the free market, regardless of their
behavior.
4. Contrasting Risks
Judges who mediate cases assigned to them take greater risks than private
mediators. Those who hire a respected litigator to mediate understand that
there will be no subsequent contact between the attorney or her client and the
mediator as it relates to the trial phase of the dispute. Those litigants assigned
29 See Fox, supra note 6, at 152 (urging judicial mediators to "never breach a confidence"
and cautioning that misuse of confidential information "will result in a serious loss of confi-
dence in the judge's good faith and impair his future effectiveness").
" See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 239-40 (1979) (noting that private market "[j]udges will tend to promul-
gate vague standards which give each party to a dispute a fighting chance" and reasoning
that clear rules that indicate how a private market judge is "likely to decide a case will assure
that no disputes subject to the rule are submitted to that judge since one party will know that
it will lose").
31 906 P.2d 1260, 1270 (Cal. 1995).
32 Id.
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to a judge who mediates have no such guarantee. Professor Sander terms this a
problem of "role confusion," and considers such confusion a major concern
regarding "judges doing mediation. 3 3
A judge who mediates another judge's case also faces some reputational
risk. If she erroneously evaluates a case, she could lose face and suffer consid-
erable damage to her reputation. Since, by definition, a mediator's evaluation
of a case is based on incomplete information, errors are bound to occur from
time to time. These errors will effect the mediation judge in a different way
than the private mediator who does not routinely decide cases following a
mediation.
II. TIHE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
The traditional view permitting unregulated judicial mediation was an out-
growth of the Rule 16 pretrial conference, combined with the increasing, and
now routine, use in the federal courts of the individual calendar system.34 The
growth of the individual calendar system in which "judges are assigned a case
at the time of its filing and assume responsibility for shepherding the case to
completion, 35 created a sense of judicial accountability for each assigned
case.3 6 As dockets became more crowded, this sense of individual responsibil-
ity may have increased. With the advent of efficiency-minded court clerks,
judges received written report cards, in the form of memoranda, listing their
mean disposition rates. 37 A typical judge felt peer pressure to dispose of
assigned cases while working in a context involving "a spirit of competition."38
In an important article, Professor Judith Resnik set forth a type of cultural
explanation for promotion of settlement and avoidance of trial by federal
33 Sander, supra note 18, at 11. Accord Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Inquiry: Transforming the Meaning of Article II, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1002 (2000)
(describing "role-blurring" of judges as their job has shifted from "adjudicator to manager to
settler to dealmaker").
3,4 In the individual calendar system, a case is assigned to an individual judge at the time it is
filed and remains the responsibility of that judge for the remainder of the case. See, e.g.,
STEVEN FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS (1977); Note, The Assignment of Cases to Federal District Judges, 27
STAN. L. REV. 475, 476-81 (1975) (describing individual calendar system as one in which
"each judge is responsible for his own calendar," and urging adoption of a system that pre-
assigns complex and criminal cases to appropriate judges).
35 Resnik, supra note 20, at 378.
36 Cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456-58
(1983) (theorizing that responsibility of judges is a good thing, and that increasing
bureaucratization of the judiciary tends to reduce this important sense of responsibility).
37 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 404 (noting that "[wlith the individual calendar sys-
tem, the publication of each judge's case load, and comparative data on judges' performance,
judges can learn which of their colleagues dispose of the most cases") (footnote omitted);
Eve Lieber, Maximum Case Management with Minimum Judge Time, JUDGES' J., Fall 1986,
at 4, 16 ("Effective case management begins by defining general time standards for the
disposition of cases.").
38 See FLANDERS, supra note 34, at 13. See also Resnik, supra note 20, at 404 (concluding
that "peer pressure tends to generate more vigorous [judicial] management").
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judges.3 9 Professor Resnik first described the federal judge sitting in 1915 as a
"solo player," noting that there were only 120 district judges at that time who
sat "with few shared practices."4 ° The early twentieth century federal judge
toiled in isolation. Resnik points out that the twentieth century growth of the
American Bar Association led to procedural reforms such as passage of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4" In the pre-Federal Rules period, the lack of
uniform procedures undoubtedly contributed to a culture of judging that
excluded pressures to settle rather than to try cases.
Resnik sees the passage of the Federal Rules as part of a more significant
trend toward unifying the federal judiciary.4 a According to this view, the trend
towards a more bureaucratic federal court system includes the authorization of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,43 the development by the
Judicial Conference of the 1960 Handbook for Protracted Cases,44 the shift
from a master calendar system to an individual calendar that focused the
responsibility of case management upon the assigned judge," and formal judi-
cial education.
4 6
Professor Resnik describes these factors as transforming the federal court
system into an agency in the broad sense of the word.47 The court system has a
set of collective interests to advance, bureaucratic machinery at its disposal,
and, obviously, considerable power.4 8 The net result today is a federal judicial
system that functions with substantial discretion and raw power in the hands of
its judges.4 9
The succinct, two paragraph, original 1938 version of Rule 16, which pro-
vided that the court could hold a discretionary pretrial conference, said nothing
" See Resnik, supra note 33, at 925 (explaining a federal judge's statement that trial cases
evidence a "lawyers' failure"). See also WOLF HEYDEBRAND & CARROLL SERON, RATIO-
NALIZING JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 185 (1990)
(describing a shift in the federal trial courts from a culture of adjudication to one of
administration).
40 Resnik, supra note 33, at 933-34.
41 Id. at 934.
42 Id. at 937-38.
13 See Peter Graham Fish, Crises, Politics, and Federal Judicial Reform: The Administra-
tive Office Act of 1939, 32 J. POL. 599 (1970) (detailing historical origin of Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts).
44 See Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D.
351 (1960).
41 See Resnik, supra note 33, at 940-43 (stressing that the switch from a master calendar to
an individual assignment system was a business-like effort designed to embrace every case,
not just so-called complex cases).
46 Id. at 943-49.
47 Id. at 949.
48 See, e.g., HEYDEBRAND & SERON, supra note 39, at 30-31 (describing a bureaucratic
"court rationalization" that has occurred in the federal judiciary by "systematization, codifi-
cation of procedures, simplification, and routinization of work" in the face of new judgeships
and court reorganization).
49 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513 (1996)
(setting forth a historical vision of a "power grab by the judiciary"); Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Per-
spective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (setting forth a history of federal procedure in which
a tradition of judicial equity and discretion becomes the modem norm).
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about settlement in its list of subjects for consideration.5° In its original form,
the pretrial conference was held "to prepare for, not to avert, trial.",51 Profes-
sor Marc Galanter has written that "the relationship between pre-trial and set-
tlement was ambivalent."'52 The purpose of the 1938 pre-trial conference was
to "sharpen cases for trial, making litigation more effective."53 Under the orig-
inal Rule 16, settlement was, at most, a useful "'by-product' , of the pretrial
conference.
The typical use of the original Rule 16 was as a discretionary conference
with the judge on the very eve of trial. As set out by Professor Tidmarsh,
"[m]y own early experience showed me that judges rarely invoked Rule 16
until they held a final pretrial conference a few days in advance of trial."55
While discussion of settlement certainly was within the broad discretion
granted the court in the original Rule 16(b)(6),56 it was not until the important
1983 revision to Rule 16 that settlement became a textual component of federal
pretrial conferences.57
Despite the prevailing tendency to downplay settlement, under the original
pretrial conference rule, leading federal judges began to openly stress the settle-
ment and evaluative function of the pretrial conference in the decades before
the 1983 revision of Rule 16. In 1962, Judge Skelly Wright recommended that
10 See MooRE, supra note 25, at §16 App.01(1) (listing, as subjects to consider at a pretrial
conference, simplification of the issues, amendment, using admissions of fact or documents
to avoid unnecessary trial proof, limiting expert witnesses, use of masters, and the catchall
"such other matters as may facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the
action"). Id. at 16.01(c)(16). For discussion of the historical analog to Rule 16, the settle-
ment conference that began in the state courts, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv.
485, 490-92 (1985).
51 Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 1961) (emphasis added). Accord
Nancy A. Welsh, Court-Ordered ADR: What are the Limits?, 12 HAMLINE J. PUB. L &
POL'y 35, 43-44 (1991) (pretrial conference not designed to explore settlement but, instead,
to insure an efficient trial).
52 GALANTER, supra note 1, at 5.
" Id., citing Edson R. Sunderland, Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 21 J. AM.
JUD. Soc'Y 125, 131 (1937) (describing pre-trial as designed to prevent concealment of
issues and to improve public confidence in litigation).
" See, e.g., PRoviNE, supra note 23, at 21; GALANTER, supra note 1, at 6 (terming percep-
tion of settlement as a by-product of the pretrial conference, a view that lasted "well into the
1950s"); Edson Sunderland, Procedure for Pretrial Conferences in the Federal District
Courts, 28 AM. J. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 46, 49 (1944) (purpose of pretrial conference to desig-
nate and eliminate issues, with settlement playing a secondary role).
11 Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 503, 506 (1996).
56 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(6) (authorizing pretrial conference to consider "any other mat-
ters appropriate in the circumstances of the case"); 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1522 (1971) (noting that, under original 1938
Rule 16, the pretrial conference had improved and facilitated the settlement process); Law-
rence F. Schiller & James A. Wall, Jr., Judicial Settlement Techniques, 5 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 39, 42 (1981) (concluding that courts "have been willing to become involved in
settlement discussions at the [Rule 16] conference under the umbrella of subsection (6) of
the Rule").
57 See MOORE, supra note 25, at § 16 App.03(l) (setting out 1983 revision of rule and
Advisory Committee Note).
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
judges put a value on a case at a pretrial conference.5 8 In 1975, Judge Renfrew
asserted that "judicial activism in the settlement process appears to have
received quasi-official sanction within the judicial family. ' 59 In 1977, a widely
respected district judge, Hubert Will, wrote that the court should act as a medi-
ator.60 Because these positions were stated in speeches before other judges, an
activist, pro-settlement intervention philosophy began to pervade the federal
courts.
The stage was set for the 1983 revision to Rule 16, which made it clear
that settlement could take center stage in the pretrial process. Revised Rule
16(a)(5) transparently listed as an objective "facilitating settlement of the
case."6 1 Revised Rule 16(c)(7) set forth as a subject of discussion at pretrial
"the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute."'62 Rule 16(c)(10) permitted the judge to employ special pretrial
procedures to aid in managing complex cases. It is important to acknowledge
that the 1983 revision of Rule 16 was made at a time when the individual
calendar assignment system was fully entrenched in the federal courts. The
listing of settlement as a major part of the new pretrial conference rule must
have increased the sense of individual responsibility felt by the trial judge to be
actively involved in prompting consideration of settlement. 63
The Advisory Committee's Note to the 1983 revision set forth a number of
factors relevant to the transition from the traditional view to the modem view.
The Committee asserted that, because settlement "obviously eases crowded
dockets and results in savings to the litigants and the judicial system .... [it]
should be facilitated at as early a stage of the litigation as possible."'  The
Committee Note reasoned that providing a neutral forum might foster settle-
ment, and observed that it was not the purpose of the revised rule "to impose
settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants. 65
It is interesting that the Advisory Committee Note foresaw the transition
to the modem view of judicial mediation. It observed that "a judge to whom a
case has been assigned may arrange, on his own motion or at a party's request,
58 Skelly Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141, 145 (1962).
'9 Hon. Charles B. Renfrew, Negotiation and Judicial Scrutiny of Settlements in Civil and
Criminal Antitrust Cases, CHI. BAR REC., Nov.-Dec. 1975, at 130, 131.
6 Hubert L. Will et al., The Role of the Judge in the Settlement Process, 75 F.R.D. 203, 205
(1977).
61 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
62 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
63 See, e.g., Guillory v. John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 95 F.3d 1320, 1334 (5th Cir. 1996)
(affirming sanctions against defendant Deere for negotiating at settlement conference in bad
faith); Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121,1126 (3rd Cir. 1990) (affirming trial court
authority, under Rule 16(f), to impose sanctions for failure to comply with a settlement
deadline); Hess v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 846 F.2d 114, 115 (2nd Cir. 1988)
(overturning district court contempt sanction for failing to submit a "bonafide" pretrial settle-
ment offer where trial court ordered party at a Rule 16 pretrial conference to submit offer or
be subject to sanction, and where party in previous case before same judge had been unwill-
ing to make a settlement offer until trial); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.,
871 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1989) ("The wording of the rule and the accompanying commen-
tary make plain that the entire thrust of the amendment to Rule 16 was to urge judges to
make wider use of their powers and to manage actively their dockets.").
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 16 App.03(5) advisory committee note.
65 Id.
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to have settlement conferences handled by another member of the court or by a
",66magistrate. This important sentence showed a permissive and entirely vol-
untary acceptance and transition to the modem view. The assigned trial judge
could refer the matter to another settlement judge, in its discretion, and would
not be forced to make this move.67 In the context of 1983, at the time of the
Rule 16 revision, this grant of discretion seems entirely understandable. It is
not surprising that this sentence was drafted in a way to maximize judicial
discretion. However, it is surprising that by 1983, the Advisory Cominittee
already perceived the need to provide the option that this essay calls the mod-
em view.
The modem version of Rule 16 has transformed the role of the federal
judge, as compared to the role sought in the original draft of the rule. The rule
now mandates an early case management role for the judge by requiring the
court to enter scheduling orders.6 8 The rule also encourages judges to hold
multiple pretrial conferences at various stages of litigation.6 9 More important,
the current Rule 16 has transformed the federal judge into "an active player in
the litigation. ' '7 ° In this context, it is understandable that courts routinely
address the status of settlement with counsel and are willing to suggest settle-
ment conferences.
The traditional view that a judge may mediate her own cases appears con-
sistent with the existing rules that govern present judicial conduct. While the
Code of Conduct for federal judges has the standard requirement of disqualifi-
cation where the court's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned, ' 7 1 it
also provides that a sitting trial judge "may, with the consent of the parties,
confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or
settle" pending matters.
72
The most recent Federal Judicial Center publication relevant to court-
annexed ADR takes the position that the assigned judge may serve as an ADR
neutral.7 3 It relies heavily on an advisory opinion published by the Judicial
Conference's Committee on Codes of Conduct, which interprets the federal
Code of Conduct to permit a judge to first act to settle a case, and then later
preside over the trial of the same litigation. 74 This opinion appears to provide a
clear validation of the traditional view. The opinion reasons that the Code of
Conduct's authorization for judges to meet ex parte to discuss settlement with
66 Id.
67 Id. (the judge "may arrange .... ") (emphasis added).
68 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
69 See Tidmarsh, supra note 55, at 506.
70 Id.
71 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (1990) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT],
Canon 3.
72 Id. at 3(B)(7)(d).
73 See ROBERT NIEMIc ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR 78-79
(Federal Judicial Center 2001).
71 2 Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
1999), Advisory Opinion No. 95.
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one party demonstrates support for judges to meet with both parties to facilitate
settlement.75
The same opinion, however, raises concerns about several issues associ-
ated with the traditional view. It stresses that such cases need to be analyzed on
a case-by-case basis, and that specific attention should be awarded to whether
the parties accompanied their attorney at the settlement conference, whether the
case is a bench or jury trial, and whether the parties have specifically consented
to a later trial by the settlement judge.7 6 The opinion raises a special concern
about the court's ability to impartially preside over a bench trial following a
settlement conference.7 7
III. THE ASCENDANCY OF THE MODERN VIEW
With the growing popularity of private mediation, critics began to find
fault with the traditional version of judicial mediation. The criticisms articu-
lated were, for the most part, ones concluding that the traditional view caused
several process failures. This section will catalog these criticisms.
A. The Perception of Lack of Trial Court Neutrality Following Judicial
Mediation
Perhaps the simplest criticism of traditional mediation focuses on the
potential loss of neutrality of the trial court that has earlier tried and failed to
resolve the case through judicial mediation. According to this critique, the
mediation effort will cause the court to inherently pre-judge issues during the
adjudicatory phase of a case after learning critical facts during the earlier medi-
ation phase. The important judicial characteristic of neutrality is deemed to be
undermined by an earlier mediation effort. There is a chance that the court will
be perceived as deciding a case based upon evidence and arguments presented
at the mediation rather than at trial. 7 ' The parties may also believe the judge
who unsuccessfully mediated a case may have had an emotional stake in the
resolution of the case through the earlier mediation. These problems have led
Professor Judith Resnik to conclude that, in order to preserve impartiality, we
should "prohibit a judge who manages pretrial preparation or attempts unsuc-
11 Id. ("Since the drafters of the Code believed it was necessary to expressly permit ex parte
settlement discussions between judges and parties with their consent, it is reasonable to infer
that joint settlement discussions do not contravene the Code.").
76 Id. See also Local Rule 16.3(c), S.D. Cal. (mandating the parties to consent to a trial by a
judge who previously presided over a settlement conference).
77 See Local Rule 16.3(b), N.D. Tex. (prohibiting the assigned judge from discussing settle-
ment figures with the parties in bench trials without the express consent of the parties).
78 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 20, at 385, citing Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 236 A.2d
466, 469 (Conn. 1967) (observing that when a court "persist[s] at settlement efforts and then
to hear the case and render judgment. . . inevitably raises ... suspicion as to the fairness of
the court's administration of justice"); WAYNE D. BRAZIL, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: LITIGA-
TOR'S VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL
JUDGES 85 (A.B.A. 1985) (finding that fifty-eight percent of lawyer respondents thought "it
is 'improper' for the trial judge to get involved in settlement negotiations" in a bench trial,
and thirty-three percent found it improper for the assigned trial judge to become involved in
settlement in a jury trial).
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cessfully to mediate disputes from later adjudicating contested issues."7 9 Pro-
fessor Charles Craver concludes that parties who mediate before an assigned
judge "may understandably fear the possibility of prejudicial trial rulings if
they are unable to resolve their controversies amicably."8
In Lon Fuller's terms, several of the chief conditions of adjudication are
missing when a judge mediates a case over which she later presides at trial.
Fuller theorized that a judge should: (1) "not act on his own initiative," (2) have
"no direct or indirect interest (even emotional) in the outcome of the case," (3)
decide the case "solely on the basis of evidence and arguments presented to
him by the parties," and (4) afford "[e]ach disputant.., ample opportunity to
present his case."'" Fuller's points, when combined, set forth a coherent theory
of judicial neutrality that is challenged by a judge who mediates her own cases.
A judge's decision to mediate rather than to try a case is an act of activ-
ism. Moreover, once the mediation process begins, the court has an apprecia-
ble interest in settling the case rather than trying it later. It is not uncommon
for judicial mediations to commence with a boilerplate statement by the court
that the parties have a right to try their case rather than settle through the medi-
ation process. The judge who cares about the efficacy of her mediation efforts
is prone to breach Fuller's third and fourth points. If the case does not settle
through mediation, the judge is very likely, consciously or unconsciously, to
lean against any party to the mediation who, in the court's opinion, caused the
trial. The risk of judicial bias against a recalcitrant non-settler is palpably pre-
sent. Even in cases where the mediation failed to settle without fault of either
party, the loser of a later trial might feel that the court was biased against it and
failed to consider the evidence in an even-handed fashion. This could create
the appearance of partiality that undermines the judicial branch and, according
to Fuller, prevents achieving a trial with maximum moral force.
The style of mediation provided by judges contributes to this problem.
Judicial mediation is evaluative mediation. Courts, whether seeking to settle
their own cases or those of a fellow judge, often use their "muscle" when medi-
ating.82 This is far from the more lengthy "facilitative" mediations,83 in which
a mediator strives to remain neutral and avoids evaluation at all cost. In judi-
7 Resnik, supra note 20, at 433-34. Accord James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great:
Judges Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, DisP. RESOL. MAO., Fall
1999, at 11 (concluding that judges should not mediate a case assigned to them for trial);
BRAZIL, supra note 78. Cf Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 369-70 (1978) (referring to one judging and later mediating as "'mixed forms'
of ordering").
80 CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT §16.13[2](a)
(4th ed. 2001). Craver does note that the judge who mediates her own case should point out
that "no settlement discussion disclosures would be considered during subsequent trial pro-
ceedings," and should advise the parties that failure to settle would not disadvantage any
party. Id.
81 See LON L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 706-07 (1949) (setting forth con-
ditions for a decision having maximum moral force). Accord Resnik, supra note 20, at 376
(expressing "classical view" that "judges are not supposed to have an involvement or interest
in the controversies they adjudicate").
82 See, e.g., Dodds v. Comm'n of Judicial Performance, 906 P.2d 1260 (Cal. 1996) (con-
cluding that assertive judicial style in seeking settlement in a case involving alleged sexual
misconduct by a physician was prejudicial, but not grounds for public censure of the judge).
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cial mediation, the court, lacking the time of a private mediator who is usually
paid by the hour, must quickly seek to settle the case. In a two or three hour
period, the most the judicial mediator can hope to do is weigh the respective
cases of the parties and try to find some level of overlap between the adversa-
ries that can lead to a common evaluation of the litigation and settlement.
Following an evaluative judicial mediation, each party knows how the
court has initially appraised the case, so the court no longer appears wholly
neutral. The party who may have rejected a settlement offer characterized by
the court as fair will remember this evaluation if the court later finds against the
party at trial. The important appearance of neutrality can be lost by the judicial
mediation process.
Parties who fear that the assigned judge who mediates may lose her neu-
trality may be less than candid with that judge during caucus sessions. When
compared with Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE), "parties may be more forth-
coming in an ENE session than they would be in the presence of the judge,
because the ENE session is confidential and the evaluator has no power."84
Effectively, the parties may share less information with a trial judge who medi-
ates under the traditional view than they would with either private market
mediators or a different "settlement judge" who will not later try the case. 85
B. Criticism of Pressure Tactics and Time-Restricted Muscle Mediation
Some members of the litigation bar now complain about the nature of
formal mediation supplied by judges. This subsection contains several criti-
cisms of the present process. It is largely anecdotal and is not based upon any
empirical evidence. Nonetheless, these criticisms resonate with real world
flavor.
The most common criticism is that the style of evaluative mediation used
can be overly coercive. The judge who evaluates a case, whether or not
assigned to her, is often an arm-twister by nature. Judges are accustomed to
being on top of a hierarchical chain of command. Judges who mediate may
project an attitude that attorneys should accept their view of what is a fair
settlement. The tendency for judges to be evaluative when suggesting a sub-
stantive solution led Professor Menkel-Meadow to conclude that this judicial
role may have shifted to that of "med-arb" 86 rather than pure mediation.87
While this argument cannot be taken literally - the judge will not really arbi-
trate the case - it focuses correctly on a dynamic of judicial mediation that
must be acknowledged. The fear of a subsequent trial can, and does, cause the
83 See, e.g., PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 9, at 65 (setting forth a model of media-
tion that calls for the parties to form their own positions and for the mediator to aid in this
goal by being more of a "process expert" than a case evaluator or an expert).
84 MOORE, supra note 25, at §16.53(5)(c) (commentary of Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil).
85 Id. (stressing the parties' unwillingness to be candid with a judicial mediator as compared
with an early neutral evaluator).
86 In med-arb, the parties mediate and, if unable to reach agreement, arbitrate. The mediator
shifts roles and becomes the arbitrator. The theory of med-arb is that the parties will suc-
cessfully mediate out of fear of the all or nothing result of a looming arbitration. See BRU-
NET & CRAVER, supra note 3, at 524-25.
87 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 50, at 5 10-11.
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parties mediating before a judge to consider her settlement options more care-
fully. In this way, judicial mediation does bear resemblance to med-arb.
Professor Nancy Welsh has recently expressed concern that settlements
may lack self-determination where they follow a case evaluation by the
assigned judge.8 8 She posits that a party may be coerced into a settlement by
fear that the court's subsequent rulings "will be influenced by the party's
refusal to cooperate, '"89 and questions whether such settlements are "an expres-
sion of free will."90
Another criticism of judicial mediation focuses on its duration. The evalu-
ative mediations set by busy judges are generally one-shot events with little or
no chance for follow-up meetings. When compared to the leisurely style of
evaluative mediation offered by private mediators, judicial mediation is a time-
restricted product.91 Private mediators, who are typically paid by the hour for
their services, can afford to take whatever time is necessary to arrive at a fair
and reasonable settlement. The parties often do not settle at the first mediation
session, but may reach agreement after a second session or follow-up telephone
conferences. There is evidence that longer mediations settle at a higher rate
than shorter sessions.92 In private mediation, the mediator has the incentive to
create a lengthy process in order to increase her fee.93 While parties who
closely monitor the mediator's time can mitigate this problem, the tendency of
the parties to split the mediator's fee tends to decrease an optimal amount of fee
monitoring. Nonetheless, there is every reason to believe that private media-
tions will last significantly longer than sessions held before sitting judges act-
ing as mediators.
The economics of judicial mediation makes it a different process than pri-
vate evaluative mediation. A busy and salaried federal judge may have only
two or three hours set for a settlement conference. Numerous other trial and
pretrial tasks prevent a federal judge from spending an unlimited amount of
time mediating. Within the typical two-hour period, the judicial mediation pro-
cess needs to start and finish. Judicial time for a subsequent session is often
88 Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Media-
tion: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 67 (Spr. 2001)
(concluding that "the potential for coercion remains" where a trial judge conveys an evalua-
tion of any party's case).
89 Id., citing Krattenstein v. G. Foy & Co., 236 A.2d 466, 469 (Conn. 1967) (questioning
fairness of a trial court first expressing an opinion on monetary settlement values, then later
trying and deciding a case).
90 Welsh, supra note 88.
91 See generally PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 9, at 66 (court annexed "mediation
can involve a single session of several hours or multiple sessions over time").
92 See generally Henderson, supra note 23 (collecting and analyzing data in construction
mediation and concluding that the "longer the process lasted, the more likely the mediation
would settle in full").
93 See Edward Brunet, Seeking Optimal Dispute Resolution Clauses in High Stakes Employ-
ment Contracts, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 107, 134 n.98 (2002) (asserting that "the
fact that most mediators are paid by the hour creates an incentive for the mediator to prolong
the negotiations process"); Andrew K. Niebler, Getting the Most Out of Mediation: Toward
a Theory of Optimal Compensation for Mediators, 4 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 167, 183-84
(1999) (concluding that use of a fixed fee for a mediator is more efficient than an hourly
fee).
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impossible to arrange. The judge's ability to informally caucus on the tele-
phone with a disputant's attorney following the session is limited. Such calls
take time that may be unavailable.
These constraints limit the utility of judicial mediation. Some disputes
just cannot be resolved in the small amount of time made available by judges.
Some attorneys find this process frustrating, and they may agree to mediate
more to placate the court than to settle. Under these conditions, judicial media-
tion may add a layer of procedure to a litigation process already cluttered with
procedures of less than optimal value. Other attorneys may agree to mediate
more from a need to obtain some discovery than from optimism that the case
may settle in the brief time provided.94
This is not to say that judicial mediation is unpopular. Professor Menkel-
Meadow has concluded that "lawyers overwhelmingly seem to favor judicial
intervention." 95 She cites Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil's study of lawyers
practicing in four different federal courts.9 6 Brazil found a "staggering 85 per-
cent of our respondents agree that 'involvement by federal judges in settlement
discussion [is] likely to improve significantly the prospects for achieving settle-
ment.'"9 He also concluded that attorneys supported judicial efforts to acti-
vate a settlement process for other reasons, such as better quality settlements
and settlements reached earlier in the litigation.98 While these attorney conclu-
sions seem subjective and based on intuition rather than data, they are nonethe-
less derived from informed sources having direct contact with the settlement
process.
C. Information Inefficiencies Inherent in the Traditional Method
Information plays a critical role in mediation, with the mediator standing
in the center of the information clearinghouse.99 The mediator serves as a bro-
ker of information, seeking facts with probing questions and doling out facts to
the disputants that may encourage settlement.
9 See, e.g., Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987) (reversing trial court
finding of criminal contempt of plaintiff's attorney who refused to participate in a non-
binding summary jury trial, where counsel feared that participation would disclose critical
witness statements that earlier had been found to be non-discoverable work product).
9 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 50, at 497.
96 Wayne Brazil, Settling Civil Cases: What Lawyers Want From Judges, JUDGES' J., Sum-
mer 1984, at 14.
97 Id. at 16. Of course, objective data would appear to the contrary - settlement confer-
ences are not necessarily efficient docket-clearing devices. See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 6,
at 15-16 (questioning claims of cost and time savings of ADR); JAMES S. KAKALIK, ET AL.,
JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996) (concluding that ADR techniques consume consider-
able resources and stressing costs of ADR in relation to benefits); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 50, at 504 (concluding that "[w]e have examined the efficiency argument and found it
wanting").
98 Id. Accord Menkel-Meadow, supra note 50, at 504 (articulating a "substantive justice"
by-product of settlement that avoids a winner and loser, and often creates remedies and
legitimacy unavailable in litigation).
99 See Brunet, supra note 93, at 123.
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By retaining some facts and distributing others, the mediator acts as a
filter of factual data."° In order for the mediator to sift through information,
the parties must, of course, be in a position to transfer facts to the mediator.
It is in this crucial act of information retrieval that the traditional view
judge who mediates is at a comparative disadvantage. As Sander has argued, a
party will be less likely to make candid disclosures to a judge who will later be
in a position to decide the controversy.' 1 Trust is a scarce commodity, and is
less likely to exist when a judge mediates her own case. Conversely, there will
be little reason to distrust a judicial or private mediator who will not later
decide the case. Such matters are truly "neutral" in a robust sense of the word.
A mediator who lacks a relationship of trust with the parties will retrieve
less information than a neutral who has established trust, rendering him ineffi-
cient.102 Trust, in this mediation context, means that a disputant can rely upon
the integrity of the mediator.10 3
This inefficiency will not exist in every situation. The assigned trial judge
may be in an ideal position to "rekindle previously unproductive settlement
discussions ' '  by suggesting to the parties that they give settlement negotia-
tions another try. If the disputants consent to another round of negotiation, the
judge may simply leave the room, creating a settlement event.10 5 Here, the
assigned judge may play a useful role in restarting settlement. It may be the
case that neither party is in a position to suggest another try at settlement with-
out losing face. In contrast, a third party, the trial judge, may be in a structured
position to reopen settlement in a way that leaves neither party at a tactical
disadvantage.
D. Mixed Reactions to Judicial Signaling
The complicated and sometimes subtle practice of judicial signaling has
received some criticism as well. The adage that judges not prejudge may be
inconsistent with signals from the bench.' 06 Critics also view judicial signaling
as a potential denial of due process because it can evidence a judge's conclu-
sion made without specific notice or a hearing, as well as lack of neutrality.
Some initial attention to the difficulty of defining judicial signaling merits
emphasis. A national survey of trial judges revealed that over two-thirds
thought their intervention in the settlement process was subtle "'through the
'00 See Posner, supra note 13 (describing the mediator as one who serves as a conduit of
information between disputing parties).
101 See Sander, supra note 18.
102 See THOMAS R. COLOSI, ON AND OFF THE REcoRD: COLOS1 ON NEGOTIATION 8 (1993)
(trust defined in negotiation as "being able to rely on the other party's behavior and to be
counted on by it in turn," and described as deriving from reliability and leading to
credibility).
103 Id. at 108 ("When trust is low or nonexistent in a relationship, the parties find it difficult
to reveal their expectation.").
104 CRAVER, supra note 80, at 16.1315].
105 Id.
106 See, e.g., THE JUDGE'S BOOK: National Conference of State Trial Judges 49 (American
Bar Association and the National Judicial College 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter THE JUDGE'S
BOOK] (urging judges to remain open-minded and asserting that the "judge should make an
effort not to prejudge a case").
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use of cues/suggestions."° 7 This percentage seems considerable, especially
in light of the fact that the same study showed only ten percent of the judges
surveyed rated their style as "aggressive" or using "direct pressure.
' 108
Assuming the truth of this data yields the conclusion that far more judges signal
their evaluations than offer more formal thoughts in mediation. Judicial media-
tion is much more time-consuming than signaling and creates risks that signal-
ing may avoid. What this survey may tell us is that signaling, not mediation, is
where most judicial evaluation of a case takes place.
It must be stressed that the voices criticizing judicial signaling are fewer
than those criticizing other aspects of the traditional view. There are several
possible explanations why attorneys may not be overtly critical of judges who
signal. First, signaling may not be possible to detect. Signaling can come in
many forms: it can be oral, through body language, or facial expressions; it can
be so subtle (such as a scowl) that an advocate may fail to perceive it; or a
judge's blank look or raised eyebrow when confronted with a hard to under-
stand argument can be ambiguous and misunderstood. The difficulty in
detecting accurate signals has caused some potential critics to back off - an
equivocal signal is simply more difficult to criticize.
Second, while much judicial signaling is transparent, signaling that is on
the record is more difficult to condemn. Judges' questions during oral argu-
ment of pretrial motions often show their leanings on issues beyond those
presented by the motion being argued. Because these questions are on the
record, the court's leanings are transparent for all parties to see and analyze.
Transparent, on the record signals can be considered a process in which the
court solicits the parties to submit additional information that might change the
judge's tentative thinking. Signals constitute a form of helpful notice to the
disputants of the court's potential ruling. As such, on the record signals
advance efficiency by providing new evidence that can aid the judge in reach-
ing a more fully informed decision. An exparte comment that is off-the-record
is likely to cause more criticism than a comment made before all parties with a
court reporter present.109
Written signals present a few problems as well. Trial judges frequently
send not too subtle signals when writing short opinions granting or denying
pretrial motions. It is common for a judge to deny a motion for summary judg-
ment because of the presence of an issue of fact, and to write in the opinion that
"the movant's evidence is substantial and that the non-movant's proof looks
slim." This looks like a signal to the winning side that the court thinks that the
trier of fact may decide the matter differently if the case is subsequently tried.
This signal is perfectly transparent, on-the-record, and offers little or no impli-
107 JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND PER-
FORMANCE 177 (1980).
108 Id.
109 Of course, candid comments by a judge at a mediation session are a necessary mode of
providing case evaluation. See, e.g., THE JUDGE'S BOOK, supra note 106, at 189-90 (recom-
mending in-chamber caucus sessions at settlement conferences and informal evaluative com-
ments "such as 'This case sure has its problems;' or 'This is really a dog;' 'You have good
liability, but no damages;' 'You have all the damages in the world, but lousy liability"').
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cation of a lack of neutrality. Placing a judicial signal in a written order occurs
regularly, and is normally good judicial practice.1 o
Third, some attorneys are all too happy to receive an unfavorable signal
from the court for reasons relating to client management. The attorney may
have reached similar negative conclusions about the case but might have diffi-
culty communicating this fear to a client. The unfavorable signal, in this situa-
tion, may be viewed positively by counsel. No lawyer likes to pass on
unpopular news of her own making to a client. The ability to pass on bad news
from a third party, the trial court, is helpful to the fragile attorney-client
relationship.
Fourth, some attorneys will disagree with a judge's signal but nonetheless
appreciate receiving the bad news for a different reason. This sort of reaction
can be labeled "at least we know where we stand." The negative signal is
information that may prove helpful in several ways. It may be used to reevalu-
ate a settlement offer that, in light of the signal, now seems fair. Alternatively,
the negative signal may cause a claim or defense to be eliminated from the case
earlier and enable counsel and the client to concentrate on more positive
aspects of their case. The "bad news" evaluation should be seen as free infor-
mation obtained from a knowledgeable and authoritative source."'
Consider the oral signals sent by U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-
Kotelly in the remedy trial United States v. Microsoft.1 12 This remedy trial,
which aired complaints by nine states that an earlier settlement between the
United States and Microsoft was improper, included several major signals from
the bench. The judge, presiding over a bench trial, characterized the states'
remedy proposal - to remove the Microsoft code from Windows software - as
a "'Draconian' measure that would "destroy" Microsoft's operating sys-
tem." 3 Such a signal seems clear - the judge was leaning against the states'
proposal and pragmatically decided to publicly air her inclinations. Her com-
ment was, of course, on the record. The comment also indicated the judge's
tentative position to the states, and afforded them an opportunity to adjust their
trial strategy.
Viewed in this light, a signal from the bench may advance decisional effi-
ciency and enhance the opportunity for settlement. Without a signal, the judge
may feel, for example, that the defendant's affirmative defense looks unlikely
to succeed, but the defense counsel may feel confident about her defense. A
significant informational asymmetry exists. Once the court signals on the
issue, the informational asymmetry is lessened substantially. The defendant
I 1 Telephone Interview with Judge Ellen Rosenblum, Circuit Court of Multnomah County,
Oregon State Courts (Jan. 18, 2002).
I See Welsh, supra note 88 ("[T]here is substantial evidence that attorneys prefer judges
who share their reasoned evaluations of each party's case."). Cf PROVINE, supra note 23, at
35-36 (concluding that litigators prefer judges who candidly refer to legal doctrine that may
have been overlooked).
112 2002 WL 31439450 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2002).
"3 Kevin Galvin, States Accused of 'Bait and Switch' Tactics, SEATTLE TIMES, May 16,
2002, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.con... (last accessed on January
22, 2003) (judge referred to "'a lack of clarity'" in the position taken by the objecting
states).
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and her lawyer know which way the judge is leaning and can adjust their settle-
ment strategy accordingly.
For all these reasons, judicial signaling stands apart from other forms of
judicial mediation. It is premised on pragmatic human behavior. Signaling,
while sometimes problematic, is difficult to view in a wholly negative light,
and is particularly difficult to regulate as some signaling is wholly inadvertent
and unintentional. Most signaling occurs off the record and often takes place in
private chambers. While uninformed and inaccurate signaling can be justifia-
bly criticized, the force of these criticisms appears relatively weak when com-
pared to other negative attributes regarding judicial mediation.
IV. RE-EXAMINING SIGNALING, A NORMAL AND SOMETIMES EFFECTIVE
FORM OF DECISION-MAKING
Judicial signaling represents natural behavior. Decision makers do not
wait until all the evidence relevant to a choice has been collected to begin their
evaluations. It is normal for any person who must make a decision to think
about the choices and evaluate information as it is received. The decision
maker may "lean" one way or the other while continuing to assimilate informa-
tion relevant to the decision. Such behavior is not at all aberrant and mirrors
that of a typical individual, be that person a judge or juror.
A review of psychological theory and evidence confirms that signaling is a
natural mode of behavior. First impressions are important and will undoubt-
edly occur.' 14 Nisbett and Ross stress the "primacy effect," in which early
information has "an undue influence on final judgment."' 1' 5 This research dem-
onstrates that, rather than waiting until the very last unit of evidence is
presented, a decision maker tends to make at least a tentative decision much
earlier.' 16
The natural tendency to engage in judicial signaling is confirmed by legal
doctrine. Judges have long used a precautionary instruction to jurors at the start
of the case to caution the jury not to decide the case until it begins to deliberate
at the close of all the evidence." 7 The typical judicial charge, warning jurors
against making up their minds before all of the evidence has been admitted,
demonstrates that the law has long understood the tendency of decision makers
114 See generally RICHARD NISBEI-r & LEE Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Short-
comings of Social Judgment 172 (1980) (concluding that evidence supports that we heavily
weigh first impressions).
115 Id. Soloman Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCH. 258 (1946) (suggesting that early information is processed differently than later-
acquired information because it is processed holistically).
116 NISBETT & Ross, supra note 114 (describing "recency effects, in which later-presented
evidence has undue influence on final judgment," but concluding that "these are rare").
117 See, e.g., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE NINTH CIRCUIT § 1.9 (2001) ("[D]o not make up your mind about what the verdict
should be until after you have gone to the jury room to decide that case and you and your
fellow jurors have discussed the evidence."); MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 1.05 (1995) (setting forth a precaution-
ary instruction that jurors should not make up their minds when evidence is admitted); ORE-
GON UNIFORM CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5.01 (2000) (setting forth a caution that jurors
should not decide the issue until they commence deliberations).
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to lean one way or the other before formalizing a choice. There would be no
need to caution the jury if decision makers waited calmly until all information
had been received before making a decision. This stock jury instruction should
not be considered a general condemnation of bit by bit, sequential processing of
evidence. Rather, it represents a caution for jurors to sift through all the evi-
dence, whenever submitted, when deciding the verdict.
Trial advocacy strategies, acknowledging the importance of the opening
statement, confirm a pattern of decision-making that evaluates information
early in the decisional process. Trial attorneys rate opening statements as a
crucial phase of the case." 8 Their significance represents the tendency of a
juror or judge to react quickly and early in a case. There appears to be some
evidence that jurors make tentative decisions at the time of the opening state-
ment." 9 Waiting until closing argument risks underemphasizing critical argu-
ments that some fact finders will have evaluated earlier in the case.
The realism writing of Karl Llewellyn supports this reasoning. Llewel-
lyn's thought on judging requires the litigator and judge to engage in "realistic
observation."' 0 The realist school understood that judges had the power and
human tendencies to decide cases based upon their instincts.12' The attorney
who "observed" the judge to learn the court's leanings would be attuned to
realism jurisprudence.
Focus on the "realistic observation" metaphor can be read to present a
picture of the trial process that resembles a nine inning baseball game. The
game is not over until the last inning, or the end of the trial. However, teams
may score in early innings (e.g., the trial court denies a motion to dismiss but
makes a disparaging comment about the plaintiffs case). Such early inning
scores will be fully reflected in the final outcome. Moreover, early posted
scores cause changes of trial strategy that also affect the final outcome.
The baseball analogy can be more fully developed in the context of judi-
cial signaling. A judge who clearly signals throughout the litigation process
places an identifiable score on a transparent scoreboard. To be sure, the early
inning scores posted by a judge can be obscure or opaque. Yet, the observant
litigator (and client) should be able to see the score. Identifying the score per-
mits important adjustments in strategy and becomes critical to the opposing
parties in developing late inning tactics.
118 See, e.g., William Lewis Burke, Ronald L. Poulson & Michael J. Brondino, Fact or
Fiction: The Effect of the Opening Statement, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 195, 201 (1992) (collecting
materials stressing the significance of the opening statement but presenting data from a study
of civil cases that thirty-eight percent did not change their minds after an opening statement);
THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 45 (2d ed. 1988) (asserting that
jury verdicts are usually consistent with the tentative opinions reached by jurors).
119 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 118, at 204-05 (analyzing data showing the rate of changes
in juror opinions during a case); IRVING YOUNGER, THE ADVOCATE'S DESKBOOK: THE
ESSENTIALS OF TRYING A CASE 61-62 (1988) (in discussing the "enormous consequence" of
opening statements: "At the end of the opening statements, the jurors cannot help but make
up their minds, albeit tentatively.").
120 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 144
(1962).
121 Id. at 145 (stressing that a judge is a man, not a "mechanical lawyer on a bench").
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A disputant's ability to "know the score" advances economic efficiency.
Decisional information becomes less asymmetrical as it is shared by the judge.
Serious asymmetry exists where the judge knows how she may rule but refuses
to share this information with the likely losing party. Where each disputant has
the same information, the risk-reward calculus that drives settlement choices
should lead to more efficient decisions to either settle or continue to trial.
All of the above tends to make judicial signaling normal and sometimes
valuable. Nonetheless, I do not necessarily advocate systematically increased
signals from the bench. Some signals are made with very little information or
research and are inaccurate. Occasionally, signals manifest intemperate behav-
ior. It can be argued that such signals are improper. On the other hand, a party
potentially victimized by such a signal knows that the judge must be persuaded
on the issue at hand.
Some might contend that signals can violate the judicial canon of neutral-
ity and avoid pre-judging the issues.' 2 2 However, it is not at all clear that a
judge's evaluative signal always shows partiality. The judge is merely expres-
sing current leanings when signaling and may be more than willing to lean in a
different direction if conditions change. There is also a neutral signal based
upon the information received up to a particular point in the litigation. None-
theless, signals may present an implication of prejudging and, hence, risk an
appearance of impropriety in some contexts.1
2 3
Signaling is an entirely discretionary practice and should remain so.
While signaling may be efficient under the "scoreboard" theory of transparent
leanings, no law should require it. A judge will know when there is a need and
utility to signal. Signals cannot practically be banned. Some judges seldom or
never signal; others signal frequently. Good mediation practice leaves the deci-
sion to signal up to the mediator. 124  We should treat sitting judges no
differently.
I do advocate a pragmatic view of the reality of signaling. Signaling hap-
pens. It happens despite the canons regulating the behavior of judges. It will
happen in the future despite developments in positive law that might ban or
regulate it. Our task is to evaluate inevitable signaling fairly and to consider it
as part of the settlement process.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of whether a sitting judge should openly evaluate her own
cases and share this evaluation with the parties is complicated and may not be
solved through clear, categorical rules.
Judicial settlement conferences and judicial mediation involve, at least, an
evaluation by the judge. The evaluation is likely to be more fleshed out in a
122 See CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 71, at Canon 3 (1990) (requiring a judge to "perform
the duties of the office in partiality and diligently").
123 Id. at Canon 2, entitled "[A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities."
124 See, e.g., Stempel, Beyond Formalism, supra note 10, at 973-74 (effective and sought-
after mediators use evaluation as one technique); Lawrence Susskind, Mediating Public Dis-
putes: A Response to the Skeptics, I NEGOT. J. 117 (1985) (use of evaluation techniques by a
mediator can be necessary).
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formal mediation context than in the off-the-cuff comment at a scheduling con-
ference or a motion argument. Nonetheless, a theme of this article is that an
evaluation is an evaluation, whether made at a motion hearing or at a more
formal judicial mediation session.
The question of whether to allow the judge who presides at a trial to medi-
ate the dispute earlier is not easily resolved. I remain troubled by the appear-
ance of impropriety of a judge first evaluating a case at mediation and then later
trying the case. The court's neutrality appears to be corrupted by this sequence
of events. Professor Sander's fear that judges, during trial, may misuse infor-
mation provided to them in confidence at an earlier mediation should be taken
seriously.
I am unsure, however, if a categorical rule banning the assigned judge
from mediating her case is the best answer. The assigned judge has a huge
informational edge regarding a case compared to a different judge appointed
merely to mediate. The judge may also have a legitimate advantage over an
alternative neutral. These factors may urge the parties to allow the assigned
judge to mediate and thereby risk a dual role for the judge.
Under such circumstances, my concluding comments regarding this prob-
lem may lie in very practical and incremental steps. One federal judge offers to
hold settlement conferences in his own cases, but tells counsel that he will not
preside over the trial if he holds a judicial mediation earlier.' 25 In essence, the
disputants have a choice of allowing the assigned judge to either mediate or try
the case. Interestingly, this judge seldom has to pass a case on to a colleague
following a judicial mediation, as she is usually able to successfully settle the
mediated cases. This may simply measure the judge's prudence in selecting
cases for possible mediation. By selecting disputes that are likely to settle, the
court will avoid holding settlement conferences that reach impasse.
The obvious advantage of assigning the parties the option to select the
judge's role is that it firmly separates the role of a judge as mediator from that
of later judging. Moreover, if the parties know and respect the judge who takes
this position, they will try to work harder to settle the litigation before a judge
who is likely to be a capable mediator.
The dangers of a trial judge implementing an institutional memory to pun-
ish the recalcitrant, non-settling attorney may itself be a reason to rigidly sepa-
rate the roles of judicial mediator and judge. Judging and mediating are, after
all, very different tasks, and ones that cannot be easily separated by any rigid
firewall. The role of judge requires binding evaluation, while the role of mus-
cle mediator involves evaluation of a non-binding nature. As Professor Subrin
has recently said, "the best way that judges can relate to mediation is to make
themselves available to try cases .... 26
125 Telephone Interview with Judge Garr M. King, U.S. District Court, District of Oregon
(Nov. 1, 2001).
126 Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and Much
Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 227 (2003) (arguing that judges should try cases
because of the need to provide trials and the presence of "increasing numbers of capable
[private] mediators"). See also Evans v. Florida, 603 So. 2d 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1992) ("The function of a mediator and a judge are conceptually different.... [M]ediation
should be left to mediators and judging to the judges.")
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Finally, there is reason to worry about a judicial system where courts are
encouraged to openly signal their leanings throughout the litigation. Signals
carry a message that a court has pre-judged an issue and imply a diminished
impartiality. Nonetheless, most decision makers do not wait to decide until all
the evidence is presented. Rather, decision makers, be they judges, juries or lay
members of the public, begin to decide at early phases of a dispute. Early
tentative decisions, or "leanings," are a fact of life for anyone facing a deci-
sional choice and cannot be ignored. Accordingly, judicial signaling is a natu-
ral occurrence. Signaling is also difficult to regulate. A ban on signals, many
of which are uttered in chambers, or may be non-verbal in nature, is plainly
impractical and unrealistic.
